Georgia Protest Disruption Risk Analysis 2026

Part of the Georgia & Tbilisi Security Intelligence Report series.

Situation Overview

Georgia's protest movement originated in November 2024 when the Georgian Dream government — which had just secured a disputed parliamentary majority in October elections — announced a unilateral suspension of EU accession negotiations through 2028. The announcement detonated one of the largest popular responses in Georgian post-independence history. Protesters framed the decision as an irreversible pivot toward Russian influence at the expense of the European path enshrined in Georgia's constitution. Within days, protests concentrated on Rustaveli Avenue in central Tbilisi, particularly in front of the Parliament building and State Chancellery.

What followed has become the longest sustained protest campaign in post-Soviet Georgian history. More than 400 consecutive days in, the movement has not dissipated despite repeated government escalation: teargas and water cannon deployments became routine, mass arrest sweeps detained hundreds of protesters and observers, and the government introduced successive legislative measures designed to degrade civil society's organizational capacity. Each escalation produced a counter-surge in protest attendance. By early 2026, the movement had developed institutionalized coordination structures, legal support networks for detainees, and independent media coverage that circumvented state broadcaster influence.

February 2026 introduced a documented tactical evolution: the movement began supplementing large Rustaveli Avenue rallies with distributed neighborhood-level actions across Tbilisi's residential districts. Flash mobilizations appeared in Vake, Saburtalo, Vera, and Mtatsminda — areas that operations teams had previously assessed as protest-free zones and routed staff through accordingly. The shift is deliberate, designed to demonstrate that the movement is not containable within a single corridor, and to increase the cost of government suppression by dispersing it across civilian residential contexts. For security planners, this changes the threat model from a bounded, predictable zone to a city-wide pattern requiring continuous monitoring.

Key Threat Vectors

Operational Implications

Office location relative to the Rustaveli corridor is the primary static risk variable for organizations in Tbilisi. Buildings on or adjacent to Rustaveli Avenue, Chitadze Street, and the streets immediately surrounding Parliament have the highest daily exposure. Lease decisions and office relocations should factor protest corridor proximity as a standard site assessment criterion. Organizations already in these locations should have written evacuation procedures and designated off-site assembly points.

Staff movement planning requires a tiered approach. Morning hours (before 14:00) carry lower protest risk on most days. The risk window opens from mid-afternoon and peaks between 18:00 and 22:00, when major rally events typically begin or intensify. Key movement corridors — Rustaveli Avenue, Kostava Street, the Meidan area — should be treated as contingent during this window, with alternate routing pre-planned. The February 2026 neighborhood action shift extends this requirement beyond the traditional protest zone. Staff in Vake and Saburtalo, previously outside the planning perimeter, now require the same contingency routing consideration.

NGOs and INGOs face specific exposure under the foreign agent law that is independent of physical protest risk. Organizations receiving significant foreign funding and conducting activities the government categorizes as "political" must assess their registration status and legal counsel position on compliance. The law's definition of "political activity" is broad and has been applied to standard civil society functions including election monitoring, human rights documentation, and legal aid provision. Organizations that have not conducted a legal review of their exposure under this framework should treat that review as an immediate operational priority.

Event timing conflicts require systematic planning. Protest days with major announced rallies — particularly dates tied to the EU accession anniversary, parliamentary sessions, or government announcements — will generate road closures, transit disruptions, and area access restrictions with minimal advance notice through official channels. Supply chain and logistics operations that depend on ground transport through central Tbilisi should build protest calendar awareness into weekly operational planning.

Intelligence Gaps

Protest scheduling operates on a partially visible coordination model. Major rallies are typically announced 24-72 hours in advance through opposition party communications and activist networks, primarily on Georgian-language Telegram channels and social media. However, the February 2026 neighborhood action format relies on shorter-notice mobilization — some actions have assembled within 2-4 hours of the coordination message. English-language monitoring alone will not provide sufficient lead time for operational adjustments. Real-time monitoring of Georgian-language Telegram channels used by protest coordinators is the minimum viable intelligence requirement for operations teams in Tbilisi.

Government response escalation indicators are a secondary gap. The decision to deploy water cannon, issue dispersal orders, or conduct mass arrests is made in real time by operational commanders, and these decisions are not pre-announced. The most reliable early indicators come from Georgian-language social media reporting from protest perimeter observers, and from official communications by the Interior Ministry (published in Georgian). Russian-language Georgian media and Russian state media also cover government response actions, sometimes with earlier access to official framing. Operations teams monitoring only English-language sources will typically learn of escalation events after they have occurred, not in time to redirect staff.

Opposition coordination channels are partially visible. The main protest coalition communicates openly through verified Telegram channels and social media accounts. But neighborhood-level organizing — the format driving the February 2026 tactical shift — occurs in smaller, less-indexed group channels that are harder to monitor systematically. The signal-to-noise ratio in Georgian-language protest coordination channels is high during active event periods, requiring analytical capacity in Georgian to extract operationally relevant information.

Recommendations

1. Map office and residential staff locations against protest zones. Overlay building locations for offices, staff residences, and key operational sites against both the traditional Rustaveli corridor and the emerging neighborhood action pattern. Identify which staff have daily exposure and which can be routed around risk zones without operational impact.
2. Monitor Georgian-language protest coordination channels. English-language news does not provide sufficient lead time for operational decisions. Subscribe to or contract monitoring of the primary Georgian-language Telegram channels used by protest organizers. At minimum, establish a daily check of these channels before 09:00 and before 16:00 on working days.
3. Brief all staff on the bystander fining laws. Every staff member in Tbilisi should understand that police dispersal orders apply to bystanders, not just participants. The protocol for staff who encounter dispersal orders is: comply immediately, do not photograph police operations from within the dispersal zone, and contact the organizational security focal point. Have legal contact numbers pre-distributed to all staff.
4. Avoid the Rustaveli Avenue corridor after 16:00 on known protest days. For organizations with any flexibility in staff movement timing, shift meetings and external appointments in the Parliament zone to morning hours. Build alternate routing from Vake, Saburtalo, and Vera into staff movement guidance, given the neighborhood action shift.
5. Pre-plan alternate routes for key movement corridors. Identify the two or three most critical daily movement corridors for your operations. For each, document a primary route and at least one alternate that bypasses the Rustaveli axis and the emerging neighborhood action zones. Test these alternates during low-risk periods so they are operationally familiar before a disruption event requires them.
6. Review organizational exposure under the foreign agent law with legal counsel. This review should assess funding sources, operational activities, and registration obligations. The review is not a one-time exercise — the law's implementing regulations have evolved since passage, and enforcement patterns are still being established. Organizations that completed a review at the time of the law's passage should update that assessment for current enforcement practice.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long have the Tbilisi protests lasted?

As of February 2026, the Georgian protest movement has exceeded 400 consecutive days — the longest sustained protest campaign in post-Soviet Georgian history. The movement launched in November 2024 after Georgian Dream suspended EU accession negotiations. Successive government crackdowns have not broken the movement's organizational continuity.

Where do protests occur in Tbilisi?

The primary protest corridor is Rustaveli Avenue between Freedom Square and the Parliament building, encompassing the State Chancellery approaches and adjacent government institution fronts. Since February 2026, the movement has extended to distributed neighborhood-level actions in Vake, Saburtalo, Vera, and Mtatsminda — areas previously outside the primary risk zone. Security planning that treats Rustaveli as the sole protest geography is now outdated.

Are the Tbilisi protests violent?

The primary violence vector is government crowd-control operations: teargas, water cannon, rubber projectiles, and mass arrest sweeps. Protest crowds are largely non-violent, with isolated property damage incidents in the Parliament perimeter. Bystander risk comes primarily from dispersal operations. New legislation creates legal exposure for non-participants who do not comply immediately with dispersal orders.

How do the protests affect business operations?

Operational impacts include road closures in the Rustaveli corridor during evening protest hours, transit disruption on high-attendance days, restricted access to government buildings for routine administrative functions, and staff movement constraints near Parliament. The February 2026 neighborhood action shift extends disruption risk to residential business districts. NGOs and international organizations face additional compliance risk under the foreign agent law, independent of physical disruption.

What are the new Georgian protest laws that affect bystanders?

Bystander fining legislation creates financial penalties for individuals near protest zones who do not disperse when ordered by police. The law does not require evidence of protest participation — proximity and non-compliance with dispersal orders is sufficient for enforcement. Combined with the foreign agent law, the legal framework creates compounding risk for international staff, particularly those employed by foreign-funded civil society organizations.