Is Myanmar Safe to Travel in 2026? What Operations Teams Need to Know

In November 2025, a humanitarian convoy carrying medical supplies from Mandalay to Lashio was stopped at a Tatmadaw checkpoint outside Pyin Oo Lwin. The drivers were detained for 72 hours. The supplies were confiscated. The organization running the convoy had no advance warning, but Burmese-language Telegram channels in Mandalay Region had been reporting increased military vehicle movements and new checkpoint deployments along the Mandalay-Lashio highway for five days prior. A Shan-language Facebook group in Hsipaw had posted photographs of troop reinforcements three days before the seizure.

That is the intelligence gap in Myanmar. The country has been in a state of civil war since the military coup of February 1, 2021. The State Administration Council (SAC), the junta, controls Naypyidaw, parts of Yangon and Mandalay, and some major transportation corridors. But the People's Defence Forces (PDF), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and a patchwork of local resistance groups contest or control vast stretches of the country. The front lines shift weekly. Airstrikes hit civilian areas. Landmines proliferate on both sides. And the information that determines whether a road is passable, a border crossing is open, or a township is under active bombardment circulates in Burmese, Shan, Karen, Chin, and Kachin, not in English.

This guide is not for tourists. It is for operations teams, NGO security managers, logistics coordinators, and mining companies that need to make decisions about personnel and assets in or adjacent to Myanmar.

1. Overview: Civil War Since the 2021 Coup

The February 2021 coup overthrew the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government and detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. What followed was the largest civil uprising in Myanmar's history, and its most brutal military crackdown. Peaceful protests were met with live ammunition. The Tatmadaw killed over 1,500 documented civilians in the first year alone. The actual number is almost certainly higher.

By mid-2021, the resistance had armed itself. The National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel government formed by elected lawmakers, established the People's Defence Forces as its military wing. Simultaneously, ethnic armed organizations that had fought the Tatmadaw for decades saw the coup as an opportunity. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), and Chin National Front (CNF) all escalated operations. In late 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA), launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State, overrunning dozens of military positions and capturing border towns.

By early 2026, the junta has lost effective control over roughly 60% of Myanmar's territory. It retains the central dry zone, the capital Naypyidaw, portions of Yangon and Mandalay divisions, and the main north-south highway corridor. But even in areas it nominally controls, the Tatmadaw relies on airstrikes and artillery to project power, rather than ground presence. The military is overstretched, demoralized, and losing territory on multiple fronts simultaneously.

2. Yangon: Relatively Accessible, Not Safe

Yangon remains the primary entry point for anyone operating in Myanmar. Yangon International Airport (RGN) maintains limited international connections to Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Kunming, and a handful of other destinations. The junta controls the airport, and all arrivals pass through military immigration screening.

The city itself is under heavy security presence. Military checkpoints operate across Yangon's major intersections, particularly around government buildings, military installations, and the diplomatic quarter in Bahan Township. Curfews are enforced, typically from 1:00 AM to 5:00 AM, though these shift without notice. Mobile data throttling and periodic internet shutdowns are routine, the junta cuts mobile internet across Yangon during sensitive periods, including the anniversary of the coup and during military operations elsewhere in the country.

Urban resistance cells remain active in Yangon. Small-scale bombings targeting military-linked businesses, informants, and junta administration offices have continued through 2025 and into 2026. These attacks are typically improvised explosive devices targeting specific individuals or locations, not mass-casualty events, but they create an unpredictable security environment. The junta responds to attacks with sweeps, mass arrests, and intensified checkpoint activity, any of which can trap foreign nationals in lockdown zones.

For operations teams, Yangon is navigable with proper planning. But "relatively accessible" means relative to active combat zones in Sagaing or Rakhine, not relative to any normal operating environment. Communication monitoring is pervasive. Foreign nationals, particularly journalists and aid workers, face surveillance. Arbitrary detention occurs. Business meetings require careful location selection to avoid military-sensitive areas. And the intelligence that matters, which checkpoints are active, which neighborhoods are under sweep, which roads are closed, circulates in Burmese-language Telegram groups and Viber channels, not through embassy advisories.

3. Mandalay: The Second City Under Pressure

Mandalay is Myanmar's second-largest city and the commercial hub for Upper Myanmar. The junta maintains a strong garrison presence, and the city itself has not seen the kind of sustained urban warfare that characterizes Sagaing or Chin State. But Mandalay is surrounded by conflict on three sides.

To the north, the Mandalay-Lashio highway, the main route to the Chinese border, passes through territory contested between the Tatmadaw, the TNLA, and the MNDAA. The fall of Lashio to the MNDAA in mid-2024 severed the junta's direct road connection to the northern Shan State border trade. To the west, Sagaing Region, directly across the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay, is one of the most intense combat zones in the country. To the south, the Mandalay-Meiktila highway corridor sees periodic ambushes and IED attacks by PDF cells.

Inside Mandalay, the security dynamics mirror Yangon at a smaller scale: checkpoints, curfews, internet disruptions, and periodic arrests. The Mandalay economic zone continues to function, driven largely by Chinese trade interests, but operating conditions have deteriorated significantly. Supply chain disruptions are chronic. Power outages are frequent. Banking access is unreliable.

Monitoring Mandalay requires Burmese-language sources in the city itself plus Shan-language and Kachin-language sources along the surrounding corridors. A military offensive in Sagaing affects Mandalay's security posture within hours. A road closure on the Lashio highway affects Mandalay's supply chains immediately.

4. Shan State: Multi-Faction Conflict and the Drug Trade

Shan State is Myanmar's largest state by area and its most complex security environment. At least six major armed groups operate here, along with dozens of smaller militias, and their alliances shift constantly.

The major actors include the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S/RCSS), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N/SSPP), the MNDAA (Kokang), the TNLA (Ta'ang/Palaung), the Arakan Army (which maintains forces in northern Shan), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest non-state military force in Southeast Asia, with an estimated 30,000 troops and de facto autonomous control over Wa territory along the Chinese border.

Operation 1027 and its aftermath reshaped the map. The MNDAA captured Laukkaing and Lashio. The TNLA expanded control across northern Shan townships. The junta lost dozens of military bases. A Chinese-brokered ceasefire in January 2024 paused the heaviest fighting, but skirmishes continue and the ceasefire's long-term viability is uncertain. The MNDAA now controls most of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and the lucrative border trade with China.

The drug trade is inseparable from Shan State's security dynamics. Myanmar is the world's largest producer of methamphetamine and the second-largest producer of opium. Synthetic drug production, primarily methamphetamine tablets (yaba) and crystal methamphetamine (ice), is concentrated in Shan State, particularly in areas controlled by or adjacent to the UWSA, the NDAA (Mongla), and various militia groups that operate with tacit junta approval. The drug economy funds armed groups on all sides and creates its own pattern of violence: turf disputes, enforcement killings, and confrontations between trafficking networks and communities.

5. Rakhine State: The Arakan Army and the Rohingya Crisis

Rakhine State is experiencing its most intense conflict in decades. The Arakan Army (AA), the military wing of the United League of Arakan, launched a major offensive in November 2023 as part of Operation 1027. By early 2026, the AA controls the majority of Rakhine State, having overrun dozens of Tatmadaw positions and captured multiple townships including Paletwa, Mrauk-U, and Pauktaw.

The AA's advance has created a new political reality. The Arakan Army operates a parallel administration in captured territory, collecting taxes, running courts, and providing basic services. It has declared its intention to establish an autonomous or independent Rakhine entity. The Tatmadaw retains control of Sittwe (the state capital) and a shrinking perimeter around key military installations, but its position is deteriorating.

The Rohingya crisis adds another layer of catastrophic risk. Over 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh during the 2017 Tatmadaw genocide. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State under apartheid-like conditions, confined to camps and villages, denied freedom of movement, and now caught between the Tatmadaw and the AA. Both sides have been accused of abuses against Rohingya civilians. The Tatmadaw has forcibly conscripted Rohingya men. The AA's position toward the Rohingya population remains ambiguous and varies by township.

Humanitarian access to Rakhine is near zero. The junta blocks most international aid from reaching Rakhine through official channels. Cross-border aid from Bangladesh reaches some Rohingya communities in northern Rakhine but operates under extreme constraints. Cyclone Mocha's devastation in May 2023 compounded the humanitarian catastrophe, destroying shelters and infrastructure that has not been rebuilt.

6. Kachin and Chin States: Active Conflict Zones

Kachin State

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been fighting the Tatmadaw since its ceasefire collapsed in 2011. The post-coup period has seen the KIA expand operations significantly. The KIA controls large portions of northern Kachin State and has provided training, weapons, and sanctuary to PDF forces. The Myitkyina-Bhamo corridor, the main transportation route through Kachin State, is contested. The jade mining region around Hpakant, one of the most valuable mineral deposits in the world, sits in the middle of the conflict zone.

The KIA's intelligence apparatus is sophisticated. It operates its own radio networks, maintains a signals intelligence capability, and controls information flows in its territory. For external monitoring, Kachin-language (Jingpho) community channels, particularly Telegram groups and the Kachin News Group network, carry the most detailed ground-truth reporting on military movements, road conditions, and access.

Chin State

Chin State has been one of the most devastated regions since the coup. The Chin National Front (CNF) and its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), along with dozens of local PDF units, have effectively driven the Tatmadaw out of most of Chin State. But the military responds with airstrikes and artillery bombardment targeting population centers. The town of Thantlang has been destroyed multiple times. Over half of Chin State's population has been displaced.

Chin State borders India's Mizoram and Manipur states. Cross-border refugee flows and arms movements create complications with Indian border security forces. Humanitarian aid reaches some Chin communities through Mizoram, but the supply line is fragile and dependent on Indian government tolerance. Chin-language (Hakha Chin, Mizo, Tedim, and Falam dialects) community channels and church networks are the primary information sources for ground conditions.

7. Areas of Limited Accessibility

There are no safe areas in Myanmar in the conventional sense. However, some zones present lower immediate risk than others.

• Central Yangon: The commercial core. Sanchaung, Kamayut, Hlaing, Bahan townships, is navigable with security awareness. Risk is from arbitrary detention and being caught in sweeps, not from active combat.
• Naypyidaw: The capital is the most heavily secured city in Myanmar. Access is tightly controlled. There is minimal combat risk but maximum surveillance and detention risk for anyone the junta considers suspicious.
• Wa territory (eastern Shan State): The United Wa State Army maintains de facto autonomy. The area is not in active conflict with the Tatmadaw but is heavily militarized, deeply involved in the drug trade, and effectively closed to international access without UWSA permission.
• Parts of Mon State and Tanintharyi Region: Lower-intensity conflict compared to Sagaing, Chin, or Rakhine, but PDF activity, landmines, and military checkpoints still present risks. The Dawei-Myeik corridor sees periodic disruptions.

8. Humanitarian Access and NGO Operations

Myanmar's humanitarian crisis is one of the world's largest and least accessible. The UN estimates over 18 million people need humanitarian assistance. Over 3 million are internally displaced. And the aid delivery infrastructure that existed before the coup has been systematically dismantled by the junta.

The junta controls visa issuance for international staff, travel permits for in-country movement, and customs clearance for imported supplies. It uses this control to block aid from reaching resistance-held areas and to redirect assistance to populations and locations that serve its political objectives. International organizations that refuse to comply face staff detentions, office closures, and expulsion.

Cross-border aid operations have emerged as an alternative. Aid flows from Thailand into Karen (Kayin) State and Karenni (Kayah) State through ethnic armed organization-controlled border crossings. Aid flows from India into Chin State through Mizoram. Aid flows from China into northern Shan and Kachin states through informal channels. These cross-border operations provide lifeline assistance to millions of people but operate without junta authorization, creating legal and security risks for participating organizations.

For NGOs maintaining operations inside junta-controlled Myanmar, duty of care requires township-level monitoring. The difference between Yangon's Hlaing Township and Hlaing Tharyar Township, separated by a bridge, can be the difference between a manageable security environment and an active military operation zone. That granularity exists only in Burmese-language community networks. Country-level advisories are useless for operational decision-making in Myanmar.

9. Mining and Resource Extraction Risks

Myanmar possesses significant mineral wealth, jade, rubies, copper, tin, tungsten, rare earth elements, and gold. The mining sector has been devastated by the civil war, but extraction continues under increasingly dangerous conditions.

• Jade (Hpakant, Kachin State): The world's most valuable jade deposits sit in an active conflict zone. The KIA and Tatmadaw contest control of mining areas. Artisanal mining continues under extreme danger, landslides at jade waste dumps kill hundreds of workers annually. Industrial-scale extraction is effectively impossible without armed group partnership.
• Copper (Monywa, Sagaing Region): The Letpadaung copper mine, a joint venture between the Tatmadaw-linked Myanmar Economic Holdings and the Chinese company Wanbao Mining, sits in one of the most active combat zones in Myanmar. Sagaing Region has seen some of the heaviest fighting between the Tatmadaw and PDF. Operations face direct combat risk, community opposition, and reputational risk from association with the junta.
• Rare earth elements (Kachin State): China-linked rare earth mining operations in KIA-controlled territory continue under opaque arrangements. The supply chain is significant for global rare earth markets but operates entirely outside international regulatory frameworks.
• Tin and tungsten (Kayah and Shan States): Artisanal and small-scale mining continues in conflict zones, feeding into Thai and Chinese supply chains. Responsible sourcing due diligence for companies downstream is nearly impossible given the access constraints.

Any mining-related operations in Myanmar require monitoring across multiple local languages. Mine site security assessments must account for the positions and intentions of all armed groups in the vicinity, not just the Tatmadaw. A single KIA offensive or PDF ambush can cut off a mine site from its supply route for weeks. Burmese, Kachin, and Shan-language community sources provide the earliest indicators of military movements that will affect extraction operations.

10. How Region Alert Monitors Myanmar

Myanmar is one of the most linguistically complex monitoring environments in the world. The country has over 100 ethnic groups and dozens of distinct languages. The information that determines operational security doesn't circulate in English. It circulates in the language of the affected community, on platforms that require linguistic capability to access and interpret.

Region Alert monitors Myanmar across Burmese, Shan, Karen (S'gaw and Pwo), Chin (Hakha and Mizo), Kachin (Jingpho), Rakhine, Mon, and English-language Myanmar sources. Our source network includes Burmese-language Telegram channels in Yangon and Mandalay, ethnic media outlets like the Kachin News Group, Chin World, Karen News, and Development Media Group (Rakhine), Shan-language Facebook groups and community forums, resistance communication channels, and cross-border humanitarian coordination networks.

Our Myanmar coverage tracks Tatmadaw troop movements and airstrike patterns, ethnic armed organization operations and territorial changes, road closures and checkpoint deployments, internet shutdowns and communication disruptions, humanitarian access conditions at the township level, and cross-border trade and smuggling route changes along the Thai, Indian, and Chinese borders.

When the Tatmadaw deploys reinforcements along the Mandalay-Lashio highway, our clients know from Burmese-language community channels in Pyin Oo Lwin, not from a Reuters dispatch 48 hours later. When the Arakan Army captures a new township in Rakhine, our clients have the operational detail from Rakhine-language sources in real time, not a one-paragraph summary in a weekly security bulletin.

For any organization operating in or adjacent to Myanmar, whether humanitarian, extractive, or commercial, the intelligence that keeps people safe comes from the ground, in local languages, in real time. That is what we provide.