Is Iraq Safe to Travel in 2026? What Operations Teams Need to Know

In November 2025, a logistics convoy carrying water purification equipment for an international NGO was stopped at a PMF-controlled checkpoint on the highway between Baghdad and Karbala. The checkpoint hadn't been there two days earlier. The convoy sat for 19 hours while militia members inspected cargo, demanded documentation the drivers didn't have, and made phone calls to people who never answered. The equipment eventually arrived, but the field team that needed it had already relocated. The checkpoint's appearance had been discussed in Iraqi Arabic-language Telegram groups affiliated with the local Hashd brigade three days before it materialized. Nobody on the NGO's security team was monitoring those channels.

That's the core problem with Iraq travel safety in 2026. The question "is Iraq safe?" has no single answer. Baghdad's International Zone operates under one security reality. A highway 30 kilometers outside the city operates under a completely different one. The Kurdistan Region functions like a different country. Basra's oil fields are accessible with proper protocols but surrounded by militia dynamics that shift weekly. And western Anbar Province still has ISIS cells detonating IEDs on rural roads. The only way to answer the question is to break Iraq into the pieces it actually operates as.

1. Iraq Security Overview: The 2026 Picture

Iraq in 2026 is not the Iraq of 2014, when ISIS controlled a third of the country. It's not the Iraq of the U.S. occupation. It's a fragmented state where the federal government in Baghdad exercises varying degrees of control depending on geography, and where a constellation of armed actors. PMF militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, ISIS remnants, Turkish military forces, Iranian-backed groups, and tribal armed factions, operate across different zones with different rules.

The U.S. State Department maintains a Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory for Iraq. Most Western governments issue similar warnings. But the advisory applies to the entire country, which is operationally meaningless. Thousands of foreign workers operate in Iraq's oil fields. International NGOs run programs across multiple governorates. Construction firms, logistics companies, and private security contractors move personnel through Iraq daily. They don't operate based on country-level advisories. They operate based on route-level, district-level, and sometimes checkpoint-level intelligence.

Iraq's security environment in 2026 is shaped by three overlapping dynamics: the residual ISIS insurgency, PMF militia politics, and the Baghdad-Erbil power struggle. Understanding how these interact in each region is what separates organizations that operate effectively in Iraq from those that don't.

2. Baghdad: Green Zone vs. Red Zone

Baghdad is a city of 8 million people, and its security profile depends almost entirely on which part of the city you're in.

The International Zone (Green Zone)

The International Zone, the fortified area along the Tigris that houses the Iraqi government, foreign embassies, and international organizations, is heavily secured. Access is controlled through multiple checkpoints with biometric screening. Vehicle restrictions are enforced. The IZ functions as the administrative and diplomatic center of Iraq, and for personnel who operate primarily within it, Baghdad is manageable.

But the IZ is not immune. Rocket and drone attacks targeting the U.S. Embassy and coalition facilities have been a recurring feature since 2019, launched by Iranian-backed militia factions. These attacks have decreased in frequency under diplomatic pressure, but the capability remains intact. Iraqi Arabic-language channels affiliated with Kata'ib Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned factions signal escalation cycles before they become kinetic, often tied to regional Iran-U.S. tensions or anniversary dates.

Greater Baghdad

Outside the IZ, Baghdad is a functioning but unpredictable city. Street crime, including armed carjacking and robbery, occurs primarily in outer neighborhoods. Kidnapping-for-ransom networks target both Iraqis and foreigners, though foreign kidnapping has decreased significantly since the peak years. IED attacks have dropped from the daily occurrences of the 2006-2008 civil war to sporadic incidents, primarily in the Diyala belt northeast of the city.

The bigger risk for operations teams is the checkpoint environment. PMF-affiliated groups operate checkpoints on major arterials, particularly on highways leading south toward Karbala and Hillah, and northeast toward Baqubah. These checkpoints are semi-official, the groups are technically part of Iraq's security forces, but individual checkpoint behavior varies by faction, time of day, and political mood. Iraqi Arabic-language community forums carry real-time reporting on checkpoint locations, behavior, and changes that formal security updates miss.

Protests are another factor. Baghdad has a strong protest culture, and demonstrations over electricity, water, corruption, and political grievances can shut down major roads without warning. The Tahrir Square area, Sadr City, and routes to the southern shrines are the most protest-prone. Mobilization signals appear in Iraqi Arabic-language social media 12-48 hours before major actions.

3. Kurdistan Region: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is a fundamentally different operating environment from the rest of the country. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) maintains its own security forces, the Peshmerga military and the Asayish intelligence and internal security service. Entry into the KRI from federal Iraq requires passing through Kurdish checkpoints. Entry by air through Erbil International Airport or Sulaymaniyah International Airport is straightforward for most nationalities.

But "relatively safe" has limits. The KRI faces two external military threats. Turkey conducts ongoing air and ground operations against PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) positions in the mountains of northern Iraq, particularly in the Qandil range, Sinjar, and the Duhok governorate border areas. Turkish drone strikes and artillery have killed civilians in villages near PKK positions. These operations occur regularly and are tracked through Kurdish-language (Kurmanji and Sorani) community channels and Turkish military announcements before they reach international media.

Iran has also struck targets inside the KRI. In January 2024, Iranian ballistic missiles hit locations in Erbil, targeting what Iran claimed were Israeli intelligence facilities. Iranian-backed groups have periodically launched drones and rockets toward Erbil. These attacks are unpredictable but follow escalation patterns visible in Persian-language IRGC-affiliated channels and Iraqi Arabic-language militia media.

Sulaymaniyah, the KRI's second city, is controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and has a different political character than KDP-controlled Erbil. It's culturally more open and hosts a significant Iranian Kurdish diaspora. The Sulaymaniyah-Iran border crossing at Bashmakh is active for trade. The city itself is safe for operations, but travel toward the Iranian border requires monitoring of Kurdish-language channels for Iranian military activity.

4. Basra and Southern Oil Operations

Basra governorate produces roughly 80% of Iraq's oil output. The super-giant fields. Rumaila (BP), West Qurna 2 (Lukoil), Zubair (Eni), Majnoon, and Halfaya, are clustered south and west of Basra city. Tens of thousands of foreign workers operate in this zone, making it the most internationally staffed region of Iraq outside the Kurdistan Region.

The oil fields themselves operate within secured perimeters with dedicated security. The primary threats are outside the wire.

Militia Activity

Multiple PMF factions operate in Basra, competing for political influence, economic control, and revenue. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, and smaller factions maintain offices, checkpoints, and armed presence throughout the governorate. Inter-militia competition occasionally turns violent. For oil operations, militia dynamics affect logistics, checkpoint behavior, access route availability, and the local labor environment are all influenced by which faction dominates a given area.

Iraqi Arabic-language Telegram channels affiliated with specific PMF factions provide the most accurate real-time picture of militia posture and intent. When tensions rise between factions, it appears in these channels 24-72 hours before any visible change on the ground.

Protests and Civil Unrest

Basra has erupted in major protests repeatedly, 2018, 2019, 2020, and periodic flare-ups since. The triggers are consistent: extreme summer heat (regularly exceeding 50C), electricity shortages that disable air conditioning, water salinity that makes tap water undrinkable, and unemployment among young Basrawis who see oil wealth flowing to Baghdad and foreign companies while their neighborhoods lack basic services.

Protests can escalate rapidly from peaceful marches to road blockades, attacks on government buildings, and, critically for oil operations, blockades of access roads to oil field installations. In 2018, protesters stormed the Basra provincial council building and attempted to march on oil facilities. Mobilization patterns are visible in Iraqi Arabic-language social media, local Facebook groups, and community Telegram channels 24-48 hours before large-scale action.

Pipeline and Infrastructure Security

Pipeline sabotage and crude oil theft remain persistent problems in southern Iraq. Criminal networks tap pipelines between the fields and the export terminals at Basra Oil Terminal and Khor al-Amaya. These operations are organized, recurring, and tracked in Iraqi Arabic-language community channels around the pipeline corridors long before the theft shows up in production data discrepancies.

5. Western Iraq: Anbar Province and ISIS Remnants

Anbar Province, the vast desert governorate that stretches from Baghdad's western outskirts to the Syrian and Jordanian borders, is where ISIS's territorial caliphate was concentrated and where its remnant cells remain most active.

ISIS in 2026 is not a territorial force. It operates as a rural insurgency: small cells conducting IED attacks on military patrols and tribal fighters, targeted assassinations of local officials and mukhtars (village leaders) who cooperated with the government, and occasional ambushes on vehicles traveling desert roads. The Anbar desert, the Hamrin mountains, and the Jazeera desert between Anbar and Salahuddin provide concealment terrain that Iraqi and coalition forces cannot permanently control.

For operations teams, western Iraq is functionally off-limits for routine travel. The highway from Baghdad to Ramadi and onward to Rutba and the Jordanian border carries military and commercial traffic, but ambush risk exists, particularly at night. The Baghdad-Fallujah corridor is the most accessible segment of western Iraq, as both cities have strong military presence, but IED risk on secondary roads persists.

6. Northern Iraq: Mosul, Kirkuk, and Ethnic Tensions

Mosul

Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, was devastated during the 2016-2017 battle to recapture it from ISIS. Reconstruction is underway but far from complete. The Old City on the west bank of the Tigris remains heavily damaged. Eastern Mosul has recovered faster, with functioning markets, university operations, and returning civilian life.

The security threat in Mosul is lower than during the immediate post-ISIS period, but not negligible. ISIS sleeper cells operate in rural areas of Nineveh Province surrounding the city. The Mosul-Tal Afar corridor and Mosul-Sinjar road carry residual risk. Ethnic and sectarian tensions between Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Shabak, and Yazidi communities create friction that occasionally escalates. Arabic and Kurdish-language community channels from Mosul provide the ground-truth on which neighborhoods and routes are stable and which are contested.

Kirkuk

Kirkuk is Iraq's most ethnically contested city, claimed by Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, with each community backed by different armed forces. The city changed hands in October 2017 when Iraqi federal forces retook it from Kurdish Peshmerga control. That transition left deep political scars. KDP and PUK politicians, Iraqi federal government representatives, and Turkmen political parties compete for influence. Each community has aligned security forces that create overlapping, and sometimes competing, checkpoint environments.

The Kirkuk oil fields are a strategic prize. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan export pipeline to Turkey remains offline since March 2023, pending resolution of the Baghdad-KRG-Turkey dispute. This shutdown affects the entire northern Iraqi oil economy and drives political tension. Kurdish-language (Sorani) and Arabic-language channels from Kirkuk track the political negotiations and security shifts that affect access to oil infrastructure.

ISIS activity in rural Kirkuk Province remains a concern. The Hamrin mountains south and east of Kirkuk city provide terrain for insurgent cells. Attacks on roads between Kirkuk and Tikrit, and between Kirkuk and the Diyala border, occur monthly.

7. Safe Corridors and Movement Planning

Iraq travel planning is fundamentally about corridor selection. The right route on the right day is manageable. The wrong route on the wrong day can be catastrophic. These are the primary corridors and their 2026 risk profiles.

• Erbil-Sulaymaniyah highway: Low risk. Well-maintained road through KRG-controlled territory. Peshmerga and Asayish checkpoints. The safest inter-city route in Iraq.
• Baghdad International Airport to International Zone: Secured corridor with Iraqi security forces. The Route Irish legacy, historically Iraq's most dangerous road, is now managed, though VBIEDs remain a theoretical threat. Iraqi Arabic-language channels monitor checkpoint patterns.
• Baghdad-Basra highway: Medium-high risk. PMF checkpoints throughout. Protest blockades possible, especially near Nasiriyah and around Dhi Qar governorate. Night travel is inadvisable. Monitor Arabic-language tribal and community channels along the route.
• Erbil-Kirkuk highway: Medium risk. Passes through the disputed territories. Multiple checkpoint layers (Peshmerga, then Iraqi Army/PMF). The transition zone between Kurdish and federal control is the highest-risk segment. Kurdish and Arabic-language channels carry real-time checkpoint reporting.
• Baghdad-Fallujah-Ramadi: Medium risk. Military presence is strong, but IED risk on secondary roads remains. Anbar tribal Arabic channels are the best source for route conditions.
• Basra city to oil field installations: Low-medium risk with proper security protocols. Dedicated access roads to major fields are secured. The risk is between Basra city and the field perimeters, particularly during protest periods.

8. Oil & Gas Operations Security

Iraq's oil and gas sector is the backbone of the economy and the primary reason most international organizations maintain a presence in the country. The operational security picture differs sharply between the north and south.

In the south, international oil companies operate under technical service contracts with the Iraqi federal government. Security within field perimeters is managed by company security teams and contracted private security, with Iraqi Oil Police (a specialized unit) providing outer-perimeter and pipeline security. The system works, but it depends on relationships with local communities and, by extension, with the PMF factions that influence those communities.

In the north, the KRG's independent oil sector has been under severe financial pressure since the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline shutdown and federal court rulings that challenged KRG oil export authority. Several international companies have exited or reduced KRG operations. Those remaining operate in a regulatory environment that is uncertain and politically charged. Kurdish-language business and political channels carry the first signals of regulatory changes and contract disputes.

Across all oil operations in Iraq, the intelligence that matters is hyper-local. Which PMF faction controls the checkpoint on the road to your installation this week. Whether the tribal sheikh whose land your pipeline crosses is in a dispute with the local government. Whether Basra's electricity supply is stable enough to prevent the summer protest cycle from starting early. These signals travel in Iraqi Arabic and Kurdish, not in English-language security bulletins.

9. NGO & Contractor Duty of Care

Organizations operating in Iraq have legal and moral duty of care obligations to their personnel. Under frameworks like ISO 31030 and donor-mandated security requirements, this means more than country-level risk ratings. It means demonstrating active, real-time monitoring of the specific locations and routes where personnel operate.

For NGOs, the challenge is acute. Humanitarian organizations operate in some of Iraq's most challenging areas, displacement camps in Nineveh, health programs in Diyala, education projects in Anbar. These are areas where ISIS remnants operate, where PMF checkpoints control access, and where community tensions can shift rapidly. A duty of care program that relies on weekly security reports from Baghdad is not adequate for staff operating in these environments.

For oil and gas contractors, duty of care extends to the thousands of third-country nationals who make up the majority of the field workforce. Indian, Bangladeshi, Filipino, Pakistani, and Nepali workers whose community channels circulate security information in Hindi, Bangla, Tagalog, Urdu, and Nepali. When a security incident affects a labor camp or a commuter bus route, it appears in these language-specific community groups before it reaches the contractor's operations center.

10. How Region Alert Monitors Iraq

Iraq is one of our core coverage areas. We monitor in Iraqi Arabic (including distinct Basrawi, Baghdadi, and Mosulawi dialects), Kurdish (both Sorani and Kurmanji), Turkmen, and the South Asian languages spoken by the expatriate workforce. Hindi, Urdu, Bangla, Tagalog, and Nepali.

Our Iraq coverage spans PMF-affiliated Telegram channels across all major factions, tribal Arabic-language networks in Anbar and the southern provinces, Kurdish-language political and security channels in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk's multi-ethnic community forums, and Basra's protest mobilization networks. We track checkpoint changes, militia posture, ISIS incident reports, protest escalation, pipeline disruptions, and regulatory shifts.

When a PMF checkpoint appears on the Baghdad-Karbala highway, our clients know from the Arabic-language source, not from a driver who got stopped at it. When Basra protest channels start circulating a date for a major demonstration, our clients know 48 hours before the roads close. When a Turkish drone strike hits a village in Duhok governorate, our clients get the Kurdish-language report before the English-language wire story.

The difference between operating blind in Iraq and operating with real-time intelligence is the difference between a 19-hour checkpoint delay and a rerouted convoy that arrives on time.