Middle East Oil & Gas Security 2026: What Energy Teams Need to Monitor

On December 3, 2025, a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile struck a tanker carrying 750,000 barrels of crude oil 60 nautical miles south of Mocha in the Red Sea. The vessel didn't sink, but it took on water and required emergency towing to Djibouti. Insurance underwriters repriced Red Sea transit risk within 48 hours. Freight rates for tankers routing around the Cape of Good Hope jumped 12% in a week. The first warnings came from Arabic-language Houthi-affiliated Telegram channels in Sana'a, 14 hours before the strike, announcing a "military operation against a vessel serving the Zionist entity."

The Middle East produces roughly 31% of the world's crude oil and 18% of its natural gas. Nearly all of it transits through three chokepoints that can be disrupted by state actors, militias, or a single well-placed missile. If your organization operates in the energy sector anywhere downstream of these chokepoints, or has personnel, assets, or supply chains in the Gulf region, this is what you need to track in 2026.

1. Strategic Chokepoints

Strait of Hormuz

Roughly 21 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day. That's about 21% of global petroleum consumption. The strait is 33km wide at its narrowest point. Shipping lanes are two miles wide in each direction, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. Iran controls the northern shore. Oman controls the southern shore. The entire passage takes about two hours for a laden VLCC.

Iran has repeatedly threatened to close Hormuz during periods of escalation. It hasn't done so, the economic consequences would hit Iran as hard as anyone. But Iran doesn't need to close the strait to disrupt it. IRGC Navy fast boats have harassed commercial vessels, briefly seized tankers, and conducted military exercises that force commercial shipping to alter routes. Each incident adds friction, delay, and cost.

Monitor: Persian-language (Farsi) IRGC-affiliated media channels, Iranian naval exercise announcements, and Arabic-language maritime forums in Oman and the UAE for real-time vessel movement reports.

Bab el-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. It's 26km wide. Roughly 8.8 million barrels of oil per day transit through it, along with a significant share of global container traffic moving between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. Yemen's Houthi movement controls the eastern shore. Djibouti and Eritrea sit on the western shore.

Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have turned Bab el-Mandeb into the most active maritime threat zone in the world. The Houthis have deployed anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and drone boats against commercial tankers, bulk carriers, and container ships. Major shipping lines rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10-14 days and $1-2 million per voyage.

By early 2026, Houthi attacks continue, though at a reduced tempo compared to the peak in mid-2024. The threat hasn't ended. It's become normalized, which is its own kind of risk, because insurance markets and shipping companies are making cost-benefit calculations that can shift overnight if the Houthis escalate again.

Suez Canal

The Suez Canal handles about 12% of global trade by volume. It's the connecting link between Bab el-Mandeb and the Mediterranean. The canal itself hasn't been directly attacked, but the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping has reduced transit volumes by an estimated 40-50% from pre-crisis levels. Egypt's Suez Canal Authority revenue dropped sharply, from $9.4 billion in FY2023 to an estimated $6.5 billion in FY2025, creating economic pressure on the Egyptian government.

For energy operations, the Suez Canal matters because LNG shipments from Qatar to European markets transit through it. Rerouting LNG carriers around Africa adds cost and time that affects delivered gas prices in Europe.

2. Houthi Threat to Shipping and Energy Infrastructure

The Houthi maritime campaign is the single largest disruption to global shipping since World War II. Their weapons inventory has proven more capable than most analysts expected. Anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with terminal guidance. Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) that can strike targets at 200+ km range. Explosive USVs that are difficult to detect and intercept. And conventional drones used for ISR and strike missions.

The Houthis target vessels based on reported ownership, flagging, insurance, and destination, but their targeting has also been inaccurate, hitting vessels with no connection to their stated criteria. This unpredictability is the core risk. A tanker carrying Russian crude can be struck alongside one carrying Saudi crude. A Chinese-owned bulk carrier was hit despite Beijing's diplomatic engagement with the Houthis.

For energy operations, the direct risks are vessel damage or loss, crew casualties, environmental contamination from oil spills, and insurance cost escalation. The indirect risks are equally significant: rerouted supply chains, delayed maintenance equipment for Gulf installations, and the diversion of naval assets away from other maritime security missions (including anti-piracy in the Indian Ocean).

Monitor: Arabic-language Houthi military media (Al Masirah TV, Ansar Allah Telegram channels), Yemeni community channels in Hodeidah and Sana'a, and Arabic-language maritime forums across the Gulf region. Houthi military announcements typically follow a pattern: claim of a pending operation in Arabic-language channels, followed by the strike 6-24 hours later.

3. Iran Tensions and Escalation Indicators

Iran sits at the center of every major security dynamic in the Middle East energy sector. The IRGC's Quds Force supports Houthi operations in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia militias in Iraq. Iran's nuclear program continues to advance, with enrichment levels at or near weapons-grade. And Iran's own conventional military capability, particularly its ballistic missile and drone arsenal, threatens Gulf energy infrastructure directly.

The September 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attack demonstrated what Iran (through proxies or directly) can do. Drone and cruise missile strikes temporarily knocked out 5.7 million barrels per day of Saudi production, roughly 5% of global supply. Oil prices spiked 15% overnight. Production was restored within weeks, but the attack proved that critical energy infrastructure is targetable.

Escalation indicators to watch in 2026:

• IAEA reporting on enrichment levels. A breakout decision, moving to weapons-grade enrichment, would trigger a crisis that could involve military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy infrastructure.
• IRGC Navy activity in the Strait of Hormuz. Increased fast boat deployments, seizure attempts on commercial vessels, or live-fire exercises near shipping lanes. Persian-language IRGC media channels are the primary indicator source.
• Iranian proxy activity in Iraq and Yemen. Increased attacks by Iranian-backed groups often precede or accompany direct Iranian escalation. Arabic-language militia channels in Iraq and Houthi channels in Yemen serve as the early warning network.
• Iranian domestic unrest. Internal instability can drive external aggression as a deflection tactic. Persian-language social media, particularly Telegram channels from Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz, track protest movements and regime response.

4. Iraq: Pipeline Security and Political Fragmentation

Iraq produces roughly 4.5 million barrels of oil per day, making it OPEC's second-largest producer. Its oil infrastructure is concentrated in two zones: the southern Basra fields (which produce about 80% of output) and the northern Kirkuk fields. Between those zones lies a web of pipelines, pumping stations, and export terminals that are targets for sabotage, theft, and political leverage.

Pipeline Security

The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Iraq's primary northern export route to Turkey, has been offline since March 2023 due to a dispute between Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Turkey. As of early 2026, negotiations continue but the pipeline remains shut. This forces northern Iraqi crude onto trucks, adding cost and congestion to the already strained road network between Kirkuk, Erbil, and the Turkish border.

In the south, pipeline infrastructure between the Rumaila, West Qurna, and Zubair fields and the Basra Oil Terminal faces periodic sabotage and theft. Tapping operations by organized criminal networks are a persistent problem. Iraqi Arabic-language community forums in Basra and Maysan governorates report pipeline incidents before they appear in official production data.

PMF Dynamics

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/Hashd al-Shaabi), the umbrella of predominantly Shia militias nominally integrated into Iraqi security forces, exert significant influence over territory, checkpoints, and economic activity in central and southern Iraq. PMF-affiliated groups control access to some oil infrastructure, collect unofficial fees on commercial traffic, and maintain armed checkpoints along major roads.

For energy operations, PMF dynamics matter at the operational level. Checkpoint behavior, local security arrangements, and community relations in oil-producing areas are mediated through PMF-affiliated power structures. Iraqi Arabic-language Telegram channels associated with specific PMF factions provide ground-truth on local security conditions that formal security assessments don't capture.

KRG-Baghdad Disputes

The relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal government in Baghdad directly affects oil operations in northern Iraq. Revenue-sharing disputes, export authority conflicts, and disputes over "disputed territories" (particularly Kirkuk) create regulatory uncertainty for international oil companies operating in the KRG area. Kurdish-language (Sorani and Kurmanji) media channels carry the earliest reporting on political negotiations and regulatory changes that affect production and export.

5. Saudi Arabia and UAE: Drone and Missile Threats

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the Gulf's largest energy producers and its most significant targets for asymmetric attack. The Abqaiq-Khurais precedent in 2019 and subsequent Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities and Abu Dhabi International Airport (January 2022) proved that air defense systems can be overwhelmed or bypassed.

Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in layered air defense since 2019. Patriot batteries, THAAD systems, and new radar installations. But the Kingdom's eastern oil infrastructure (Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery, Abqaiq processing facility, Ju'aymah export terminal) remains concentrated in a small geographic area along the Gulf coast. A saturated drone and missile attack, even with high interception rates, could cause damage.

The UAE faces a different threat profile. Abu Dhabi's energy infrastructure is less concentrated, and the country's geographic distance from Yemen provides more reaction time. But the January 2022 Houthi missile and drone attacks on Abu Dhabi proved the UAE isn't out of range. Ruwais industrial complex (ADNOC's major refining and petrochemical hub) and Jebel Ali port represent high-value targets.

Labor Market Dynamics

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE depend heavily on expatriate labor for energy operations. Workforce grievances, unpaid wages, contract disputes, living conditions, can escalate into work stoppages that affect production and maintenance schedules. These disputes don't make international news, but they circulate in Hindi, Urdu, Tagalog, Bengali, and Nepali-language worker community groups on WhatsApp and Telegram. A labor walkout at a major construction or maintenance contractor can delay turnaround schedules by weeks.

Saudi Arabia's Saudization policies (Nitaqat program) and UAE Emiratization requirements are reshaping workforces across the energy sector. The transition creates skill gaps that affect operational efficiency. Arabic-language industry forums and government policy channels track these regulatory changes in real time.

6. Oman and Qatar: Stable but Not Risk-Free

Oman

Oman sits on the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, giving it a front-row seat to any escalation. Oman's diplomatic tradition is neutrality, it maintains relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and the Houthis simultaneously. This makes Muscat a back-channel mediator, but it also means Omani territory and waters could be affected by conflict it didn't choose.

Oman produces about 1 million barrels per day and has significant LNG export capacity (Oman LNG, Qalhat LNG). Its oil fields are in the interior (Nimr, Yibal, Lekhwair), away from the coast, but export terminals on the Gulf of Oman coast face the same Hormuz-related risks as everyone else. Cyclone season (May-June, October-November) adds a weather risk to offshore and coastal operations that Arabic-language maritime weather channels cover with more local detail than international forecasts.

Qatar

Qatar is the world's largest LNG exporter. The North Field expansion (NFE and NFS projects) will increase capacity from 77 million tonnes per annum to 126 mtpa by the late 2020s. This makes Qatar's LNG infrastructure one of the most strategically significant energy assets on the planet.

Qatar's security environment is stable, no active insurgency, no recent attacks, strong internal security. But its export routes pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making it vulnerable to any chokepoint disruption. Qatar also hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East (Al Udeid Air Base), which makes it a potential target in an Iran escalation scenario.

The labor risk is significant. Qatar's massive construction and energy expansion depends on migrant workers from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Worker welfare has improved since the World Cup-era reforms, but disputes still occur. Bengali, Hindi, Nepali, and Filipino-language community groups carry early signals of labor actions that can affect project timelines.

7. Impact on LNG and Oil Operations

The operational impact breaks down into four categories.

• Shipping route disruption. Houthi attacks and Hormuz tensions have already forced significant rerouting. LNG carriers from Qatar to Europe now frequently take the Cape of Good Hope route, adding 10-14 days and $1.5-2.5 million per voyage. This changes delivered gas economics and can trigger contract renegotiations.
• Facility security. Drone and missile threats to onshore processing facilities, refineries, and export terminals require continuous monitoring. The attack surface is large. Saudi Aramco alone operates over 100 major facilities. Ground-level security monitoring in Arabic, Persian, and local-language channels provides earlier warning than satellite imagery or open-source intelligence aggregators.
• Personnel security. Expatriate workers in the Gulf face low but non-zero risk from military escalation. Evacuation planning for personnel at remote field installations needs to account for road network disruptions, port closures, and airport capacity constraints. Hindi, Urdu, and Tagalog-language community channels can provide ground-truth on evacuation route conditions faster than corporate communication chains.
• Maintenance and supply chain. Specialized equipment, spare parts, and technical personnel move through the same logistics networks that face disruption risk. A delayed turbine blade shipment through the Suez Canal can shut down a gas processing train. Track shipping status through Arabic and English-language maritime logistics channels for early warning on delays.

8. Insurance and Compliance Considerations

The security environment in the Middle East directly affects the cost of doing business through insurance premiums and compliance requirements.

War risk insurance for vessels transiting the Red Sea has increased dramatically since the Houthi campaign began. The Joint War Committee (JWC) listed the southern Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and parts of the Indian Ocean as a Listed Area, triggering additional premium requirements. Premiums for a single Red Sea transit have ranged from 0.5% to 1% of vessel value, on a $100 million VLCC, that's $500,000-$1,000,000 per transit.

Sanctions compliance adds another layer. Iran sanctions, Houthi-related designations, and Iraq-related restrictions create a compliance minefield for energy operations. Ship-to-ship transfers, origin documentation, and beneficial ownership verification all require monitoring. Arabic and Persian-language shipping forums sometimes carry intelligence on sanctions evasion schemes that affect legitimate operators.

Duty of care obligations for personnel in the Gulf require organizations to demonstrate active monitoring and response planning for military escalation scenarios. Generic country risk ratings aren't sufficient, insurers and regulators increasingly expect site-specific risk assessments tied to real-time intelligence.

9. What to Monitor: 5 Key Indicators

1. Houthi military communications tempo. Ansar Allah's media output follows a predictable pattern before strikes: increased rhetoric on Arabic-language channels, followed by specific operational claims. A spike in military media activity from Sana'a-based channels often precedes an attack by 6-24 hours.
2. IRGC Navy activity in the Strait of Hormuz. Fast boat deployments, military exercises, and vessel approaches tracked through Persian-language IRGC channels and Arabic-language maritime forums from UAE, Oman, and Bahrain. Unusual patterns indicate elevated risk.
3. Iraqi militia rhetoric and operational posture. PMF-affiliated groups use Arabic-language Telegram channels to signal intent before attacks on coalition targets or interference with oil operations. Track Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat al-Nujaba channels for escalation indicators.
4. Gulf state labor market disruptions. Worker community forums in Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Tagalog, and Nepali provide 3-7 day advance warning on labor actions, walkouts, and protests that can affect energy operations and maintenance schedules.
5. Insurance market pricing changes. JWC Listed Area designations, war risk premium adjustments, and P&I Club circulars signal market perception of risk levels. These often react to intelligence from Arabic and Persian-language sources that haven't yet appeared in English business media.

10. How Region Alert Covers the Middle East

The Middle East is one of our primary coverage areas for energy sector clients. We monitor in Arabic (multiple dialects), Persian/Farsi, Kurdish, Hindi, Urdu, Tagalog, Bengali, and Nepali, covering the full spectrum of actors, from Houthi military channels to migrant worker community groups.

Our Middle East energy coverage includes daily monitoring of chokepoint activity, Houthi and Iranian military posture, Iraqi pipeline security, Gulf facility threats, and labor market dynamics. Alerts are tied to specific assets, routes, and operational impacts.

When a Houthi-affiliated channel in Sana'a announces a forthcoming "military operation," our clients get an alert from the Arabic-language source. Not a Reuters article the next morning. Not a maritime security advisory 12 hours after the missile hits. The source, as it happens, in the language it was published.