Sahel Security Briefing 2026: What Operations Teams Need to Know

On January 8, 2026, a convoy of three supply trucks carrying drilling equipment from Abidjan to a gold concession near Kenieba, western Mali, was stopped at a JNIM checkpoint 40km south of Bamako on Route Nationale 6. The drivers were held for 11 hours. The equipment was confiscated. The company had no advance warning because the checkpoint appeared overnight, but Bambara-language community forums in the Bougouni area had been reporting armed movement along the route for three days.

That's how the Sahel works now. The juntas control the capitals. Armed groups control the roads. And the gap between what's reported in English-language media and what's actually happening on the ground keeps widening. If your organization operates in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, or Chad, or depends on supply routes that cross these countries, this briefing covers what you need to track.

1. Current Threat Environment

Two jihadist networks dominate the Sahel: JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, al-Qaeda affiliated) and ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara). They're not allies. They fight each other for territory, revenue, and recruits. But for operations teams, the distinction matters less than the geography. Between them, these groups control or contest ground across a belt stretching from western Mali to the Lake Chad Basin.

JNIM is the larger threat. It operates across central and southern Mali, western Burkina Faso, and northern Benin, Togo, and Ghana. JNIM collects taxes at informal checkpoints, extorts artisanal miners, and attacks military positions. Its command structure is decentralized, local katibas (battalions) operate semi-independently, which makes patterns harder to predict but also means threat levels vary sharply by district.

ISGS holds territory in the tri-border region where Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger meet. It's smaller but more violent. ISGS targets civilians more frequently and has carried out mass-casualty attacks against villages aligned with rival groups or government forces. The Tillaberi region of Niger and Liptako-Gourma zone remain its core operating area.

Then there's Wagner Group, now rebranded as Africa Corps after Prigozhin's death. Russian military contractors operate in Mali, Burkina Faso, and to a lesser extent Niger. They've replaced departing French forces at several forward operating bases. Their presence complicates the security picture: they conduct operations against jihadist groups but also against civilian communities suspected of harboring fighters. Reports from Bambara and Fulfulde-language sources describe displacement caused by Africa Corps operations in the Mopti and Segou regions of Mali throughout late 2025.

2. Country-by-Country Assessment

Mali

Mali's military junta, in power since 2020, has consolidated control in Bamako but faces armed opposition across much of the country. The north is contested between Tuareg separatist groups (CMA/CSP-PSD), JNIM, and ISGS. The center, particularly the Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso regions, sees regular JNIM attacks on military positions and supply convoys.

For operations teams, the key risk is road security. Route Nationale 1 (Bamako-Gao) is functionally impassable without military escort past Segou. RN6 (Bamako-Bougouni-Sikasso, connecting to Cote d'Ivoire) faces increasing JNIM activity. Air transport is the safest option for personnel movement, but cargo still moves by road, and road closures cascade through supply chains.

Monitor: Bambara and French-language Telegram groups in Bamako, Mopti, and Sikasso. Tamasheq-language channels carry the earliest reporting on northern Mali movements.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is the most dangerous country in the Sahel for civilian casualties. JNIM and ISGS together control or contest roughly 40% of national territory. The Est, Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions are effectively ungoverned. The military junta under Captain Traore has recruited auxiliary militias (VDP. Volontaires pour la Defense de la Patrie) that operate with minimal oversight, adding another layer of armed actors.

The capital Ouagadougou itself has been targeted. IED attacks within the city occurred three times in the second half of 2025. The Ouagadougou-Koudougou-Bobo-Dioulasso corridor (RN1), the country's economic backbone connecting to Cote d'Ivoire, has seen ambushes within 100km of the capital.

Monitor: French and Moore-language community channels, Ouagadougou-based security WhatsApp groups, and Fulfulde-language forums in the Sahel and Est regions.

Niger

Niger's junta, which seized power in July 2023, has pushed out French and American military forces and pivoted toward Russia, Iran, and Turkey for security partnerships. The withdrawal of Western military assets left gaps in ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) coverage across the Tillaberi and Diffa regions, areas where ISGS and Boko Haram/ISWAP operate.

Uranium mining in the Agadez region (Orano's operations near Arlit) faces a different set of risks: banditry, Tuareg grievances, and the uncertainty of operating under a junta that nationalized several mining contracts in 2025. Gold mining near the border with Burkina Faso is disrupted by ISGS activity and competition between artisanal miners and licensed operators.

Monitor: Hausa and Zarma-language channels, Niamey-based French-language media, and community forums along the Niger-Nigeria border for Diffa region reporting.

Chad

Chad sits at the eastern edge of the Sahel crisis and the western edge of the Sudan conflict. Both are bleeding in. The Lake Chad Basin in the west faces Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks. The eastern border with Sudan's Darfur region is absorbing refugees and armed group spillover from the RSF-SAF civil war. Over 600,000 Sudanese refugees crossed into eastern Chad in 2025.

N'Djamena is relatively stable but resource-strained. The Chadian military, historically the Sahel's most capable conventional force, is stretched between its western, eastern, and northern fronts. For operations teams, the key risk is logistical: Chad is landlocked, and its primary supply routes run through either Cameroon (Douala port corridor) or Nigeria (Maiduguri corridor). Both face their own disruption risks.

Monitor: French and Arabic-language sources in N'Djamena, Chadian Arabic community forums for eastern border reporting, and Kanuri-language channels for Lake Chad Basin updates.

3. Impact on Mining Operations

The Sahel holds significant gold reserves. Mali was Africa's third-largest gold producer in 2024. Burkina Faso and Niger both have expanding gold sectors. But extraction is getting harder.

Industrial gold mines in Mali. Fekola (B2Gold), Loulo-Gounkoto (Barrick), Syama (Resolute Mining), face rising costs from security escorts, supply disruptions, and junta-imposed fiscal changes. Mali's government raised mining royalties and introduced a new "strategic minerals" tax in 2025. Combined with the physical security costs, margins are compressing.

Artisanal mining creates a parallel risk. An estimated 1.5 million people work in artisanal gold mining across the Sahel. These operations overlap with industrial concessions, creating land disputes that can escalate into blockades and violence. In Burkina Faso's Sahel region, JNIM and ISGS both tax artisanal miners, turning gold sites into revenue sources for armed groups and making them targets for military operations.

The intelligence gap is acute. Disputes between artisanal miners and concession holders develop over days and weeks in Bambara, Fulfulde, and Moore-language community networks. By the time a company's in-country security manager hears about it, the blockade is already in place.

• Kenieba (Mali): Gold corridor near the Senegal border. Watch Bambara and Malinke-language forums for artisanal mining disputes and road access issues on RN4.
• Essakane (Burkina Faso): IAMGOLD's mine in the Sahel region operates in one of the most insecure zones in the country. Monitor Fulfulde and French-language sources for armed group movements within 100km radius.
• Liptako-Gourma tri-border: Gold-rich area contested by ISGS. Artisanal mining activity intersects with jihadist taxation networks. Zarma, Hausa, and Fulfulde sources carry the ground-level picture.

4. Impact on Humanitarian Access

The humanitarian crisis in the Sahel is one of the world's worst. Over 3 million internally displaced people across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. But delivering aid is increasingly difficult, and getting more dangerous.

All three junta governments have expelled or restricted international organizations. Mali expelled MINUSMA (the UN peacekeeping mission) in 2023. Burkina Faso has suspended or expelled multiple NGOs. Niger restricted humanitarian access to several regions in 2025. The pattern is consistent: juntas view international organizations with suspicion and prefer to control the narrative around their internal conflicts.

For NGOs still operating in the Sahel, the risks are layered. Armed groups target aid convoys for supplies. Military forces suspect humanitarian workers of collaboration with armed groups. Community tensions around aid distribution can turn violent. And the bureaucratic environment, permits, travel authorizations, visa renewals, is weaponized to control NGO movement.

5. Supply Chain and Logistics Risks

The Sahel is landlocked. Everything, fuel, food, equipment, spare parts, comes by road from coastal ports. These corridors are the lifelines, and they're under pressure from every direction.

• Abidjan-Bamako corridor (via Sikasso): Historically the most reliable route into Mali. JNIM activity in southern Mali has increased ambush risk on the Sikasso-Bamako segment. Transit times have increased 30-40% due to additional security checkpoints.
• Tema/Lome-Ouagadougou corridor: Primary supply route for Burkina Faso. The Ghanaian and Togolese segments are relatively secure, but the Burkina Faso segment from the border to Ouagadougou faces regular disruptions. Convoys increasingly travel with military escort.
• Cotonou-Niamey corridor: The fastest route to Niger's capital runs through Benin's northern departments, where jihadist activity has surged since 2024. Benin deployed military forces to the Alibori and Atacora departments, creating checkpoints that add 8-12 hours to transit times.
• Douala-N'Djamena corridor: Chad's primary import route through Cameroon. Boko Haram activity in Cameroon's Far North region and banditry in the Adamawa corridor add risk, though this route is more stable than the alternatives.

Route closures happen fast. A successful JNIM ambush on a military convoy can shut a road for 48-72 hours. A VDP militia checkpoint dispute can block traffic for days. The only advance warning comes from local-language sources, truckers' WhatsApp groups, community radio broadcasts, and Telegram channels in French, Bambara, Moore, and Hausa.

6. Communication and Monitoring Challenges

The Sahel is one of the hardest regions in the world to monitor from outside. The reasons are structural.

First, language. French is the official language across all four countries, but it's not the primary communication language for most people. Bambara dominates in Mali. Moore and Dioula in Burkina Faso. Hausa and Zarma in Niger. Chadian Arabic and Sara in Chad. Fulfulde is spoken across all four countries by Fulani communities, often the most affected by the conflict. Critical ground-truth information circulates in these languages, not in French, and almost never in English.

Second, infrastructure. Internet penetration across the Sahel remains below 25%. Mobile networks are unreliable outside major cities. Government-imposed internet shutdowns and social media blocks happen regularly. Burkina Faso shut down mobile internet for 72 hours during a military operation in December 2025. When shutdowns happen, FM radio becomes the primary information channel, and monitoring it requires in-region capability.

Third, access. Most international security firms don't have analysts who speak Bambara, Fulfulde, or Zarma. They rely on French-language media, which itself relies on government press releases and urban-based journalism. The gap between what's happening in Mopti or Djibo and what appears in Bamako or Ouagadougou-based French media can be 24-72 hours.

7. What to Monitor: 5 Key Indicators

These are the signals that precede major disruptions. Track them weekly at minimum.

1. Armed group checkpoint activity on key corridors. New checkpoints or changes in existing ones signal shifts in territorial control. Bambara and French-language trucker forums are the first source. If a checkpoint appears on RN1 in Burkina or RN6 in Mali, supply chains will feel it within 48 hours.
2. Junta government decrees on mining and foreign organizations. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all issued surprise regulatory changes targeting mining companies and NGOs. Monitor French-language government gazettes and local radio broadcasts in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey.
3. Refugee and IDP movement patterns. Large population movements signal deteriorating security before attack data confirms it. Fulfulde and Hausa-language community networks in displacement zones carry this information first.
4. Africa Corps/Wagner deployment changes. Russian military contractor movements correlate with civilian displacement and operational tempo changes. French and Bambara-language sources in Mopti and Segou regions track these movements more accurately than international media.
5. Artisanal mining disputes escalating toward violence. Land disputes between artisanal miners and concession holders follow a pattern: community meetings, formal complaints, roadblocks, then violence. The first two stages are visible in local-language community forums 1-3 weeks before disruptions start.

8. How Region Alert Covers the Sahel

The Sahel is one of our core coverage areas. We monitor across 11 languages in the region, pulling from sources that most security firms can't access because they don't have the linguistic capability.

Our Sahel coverage includes daily monitoring of armed group activity on supply corridors, mining sector disruptions, humanitarian access changes, and political developments from the junta governments. Alerts are tied to specific routes, locations, and operational impacts, not generic country-level assessments.

When a JNIM checkpoint appears on the Sikasso-Bamako road, our clients know about it from Bambara-language trucker channels, not from a Reuters article two days later.